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ABSTRACT 
Conventional thinking would suggest that Russia is positioning its vast energy 
resources to economically influence and undermine European cohesion and its 
trans-Atlantic relationship. However, Russia remains heavily dependent on the sale and 
export of its energy resources to Europe, and its future economic viability is tied directly 
to Europe’s continued use of fossil fuels as opposed to its desired transition to green 
energy. This thesis is exploratory research utilizing system dynamics modeling to identify 
various risk factors that affect Russia and Europe’s energy relationship and assess their 
potential impacts on collective security strategies. This thesis has two purposes: (1) 
model the dynamic energy relationships between Russia and Europe, utilizing Germany 
and Estonia as specifics case studies, and (2) model policy scenarios to assess their 
impact on Russia, Europe, and trans-Atlantic relationships. The exploratory research in 
this thesis will aid U.S. and NATO national security decision-makers by providing them 
with a combination of qualitative and quantitative insights and analysis to enhance 
their understanding of risk factors that affect Russia and Europe’s energy relations. 
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As the United States, the European Union (EU), and the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO) countries realign their efforts and resources from international 
terrorism to major power competition, relationships with Russia become a central focus. 
The United States and its trans-Atlantic partners continue to vocalize their respective 
concerns about Russian behavior and highlight perceived security risks from Russia. 
However, at the same time, some European countries increased their imports of Russian 
energy resources, which contradicted their worries about Russia. This thesis utilizes system 
dynamics modeling to analyze Russian and European energy relationships to identify how 
they may affect the security concerns of the EU, NATO, and its trans-Atlantic partners. 
The analysis in this research focuses on Russia’s exportation of natural resources to 
European countries and the potential influence that Russia may wield due to the economic 
dependence on Russian energy.  
To analyze the strategic implications of Russia’s energy relationships across 
Europe, this thesis uses systems thinking to identify and understand casual links between 
regional policies and system dynamics modeling to quantify interrelated variables and their 
impact on potential systemic behavioral outcomes over time. Estonia and Germany are the 
focus of this thesis, two countries that possess unique similarities and differences in both 
their historical relationship with Russia and importance to NATO.  
Current assessments assume that Estonia is one of the most vulnerable EU and 
NATO members due to its proximity to Russia and its ethnic Russian minority and that 
Germany is vulnerable to Russian influence due to its dependency on Russian energy 
resources. However, this thesis found that while Russia’s energy influence is strong, it does 
not afford Russia political leverage over Estonia. Additionally, the small amount of 
revenue generated from fossil fuel exports to Estonia does not significantly affect Russia’s 
overall revenue, trade balance, or ability to cover its government’s expenses. Although 
Germany currently imports most of its oil and gas from Russia, Germany’s policies are 
quickly moving the country towards renewables and potentially away from Russian oil and 
gas. Using the German and Estonia case studies to extrapolate a broader strategic 
xiv 
understanding, this thesis suggests that Europe, not Russia, holds strategic leverage due to 
Russia’s dependence on oil and natural gas revenue from Europe. The Russian economy is 
reliant upon its natural gas and oil exports, and any reduction in revenue has the potential 
to destabilize its economy and defense spending.  
In the contemporary global environment, identified by U.S. strategic documents as 
“Great Power Competition,” the United States, EU, and NATO must develop strategies to 
compete with rising and revisionist powers below the threshold of armed conflict. It is 
important that the EU, NATO, and the U.S. fully understand the future role of how energy 
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Over the past 18 years, the United States claimed free and fair-trade as a cornerstone 
principle of its national security strategies. This resulted in the United States and its 
European allies encouraging the adoption of free and fair-trade policies that ushered in an 
era where institutions and new trade agreements were the hallmarks of an increasingly 
interdependent and interconnected world. The result was the greatest combined gross 
domestic product (GDP) average per country in history. However, as nations’ economies 
became increasingly interconnected, they began to rely on each other more for food, 
energy, labor, and other goods and services previously produced and provided 
domestically. Suddenly, nations found themselves dependent on others to provide 
defensive capabilities, to meet their energy demands and to provide important 
telecommunications capabilities and equipment. Most alarmingly, the dependencies that 
developed from globalization sometimes created the perfect opportunity for exploitation 
from adversarial nations.  
The year 2017 was a turning point in national security of the United States. The 
United States National Security Strategy (NSS) and U.S. National Defense Strategy (NDS) 
shifted the focus and priority of the national security apparatus from counterterrorism to 
competition with major powers.1 As stated by former Secretary of Defense James Mattis 
in a 2018 speech to Johns Hopkins University’s Paul H. Nitze School of Advanced 
International Studies, “Great power competition—not terrorism—is now the primary focus 
of U.S. national security.”2 This shift in priorities came from an assessment that strategic 
competition from powerful and adversarial nations was the greatest threat to U.S. national 
                                                 
1 Donald J. Trump, National Security Strategy of the United States of America (Washington, DC: 
Office of the President, 2017); Jim Mattis, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy (Washington, 
DC: Department of Defense, 2018). 
2 Dan Lamothe, “Mattis Unveils New Strategy Focused on Russia and China, Takes Congress to Task 




interests.3 Similar assessments consider Russia as one of the United States’ most 
significant security challenges.4 United States strategic documents specifically list Russia 
as a significant power determined to erode American security and prosperity by growing 
its military, making world economies less free and less fair, and controlling information 
and data to repress societies and to expand their influence.5 Additionally, they describe 
Russia as determined to undermine the security and prosperity of Europe through actions 
intended to create disunity between NATO allies. While the United States and NATO 
focused on counterterrorism following al-Qaeda’s attacks on 9/11, Russia modernized its 
military, strategically invested in developing its energy resources, and adapted its 
information and psychological operations capabilities to capitalize on current technologies. 
To prevail in a future strategic environment of major power competition, NATO—and its 
economic partner, the European Union—need to develop a greater understanding of the 
challenges and opportunities vis-à-vis its competition with Russia.  
A. OVERVIEW 
As economic power disperses across the globe, some countries, such as Russia, 
ignore the institutional rules and international norms that exist to advance parochial foreign 
policies through economic coercion. Economic coercion includes intellectual property 
theft, economic coercion, illicit financing, and other measures aimed at increasing a 
nation’s geopolitical leverage and standing in the world.6 This is the threat that Russia 
poses to the international order today. Conversely, some argue that Russia’s threat to the 
international order will eventually diminish because of domestic economic and political 
failure to reform. However, Russia’s vast energy reserves in oil and gas provide it an 
opportunity to improve its domestic situation and simultaneously improve its standing as a 
                                                 
3 Dan Coats, Global Trends: Paradox of Progress (Washington, DC: National Intelligence Council, 
2017). 
4 Mattis, Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy, 4. 
5 Trump, National Security Strategy of the United States of America, 2. 
6 John Schaus, “Gray Zone Tools: Economic Coercion” (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and 
International Studies, December 7, 2018), https://youtu.be/I5nYt-eVGO8. 
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world power that can confront the European Union (EU), NATO, and the U.S. and 
challenge the stability of Europe.7 
B. RESEARCH QUESTION 
Conventional thinking would suggest that Russia is positioning its vast energy 
resources to economically influence and undermine European cohesion and its trans-
Atlantic relationship. However, Russia remains heavily dependent on the sale and export 
of its energy resources to Europe, and its future economic viability is tied directly to 
Europe’s continued use of fossil fuels as opposed to its desired transition to green energy. 
What are the various risk factors that affect Russian and European energy relations and 
what are their impacts on collective security strategies?  
C. RESEARCH PURPOSE 
This thesis uses an exploratory research methodology utilizing system dynamics 
modeling to assess both Russia’s ability to affect European cohesion and alliances and the 
impact Europe’s planned transition away from fossil fuels will have on Russia’s economy. 
This thesis has two purposes: (1) model the dynamic energy relationship between Russia 
and Europe, utilizing Germany and Estonia as specifics case studies, and, (2) model policy 
scenarios to assess their impact on Russia, Europe, and trans-Atlantic relationships. The 
exploratory research in this thesis will aid U.S. and NATO national security decision-
makers by providing them a combination of qualitative and quantitative insights and 
analysis to enhance their understanding of various risk factors that affect Russia and 
Europe’s energy policy.  
  
                                                 
7 Kenneth Rogoff, “Russia’s Future Looks Bleak without Economic and Political Reform,” The 
Guardian, July 5, 2017, https://www.theguardian.com/business/2017/jul/05/there-is-little-reason-to-be-
cheerful-about-russias-growth-prospects; Holly Ellyatt, “Russia Wants to Prove that ‘Doomsday’ Forecasts 
Have Failed,” CNBC, May 22, 2018, https://www.cnbc.com/2018/05/22/spief-2018-russia-wants-to-prove-
that-doomsday-forecasts-have-failed.html; David Shipley, “Vladimir Putin’s Mission Impossible,” 
Bloomberg, August 29, 2018, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2018-08-29/russia-2024-
vladimir-putin-s-economic-mission-impossible. 
4 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
At a fundamental level, it is vital to understand how Russia intends to shape the 
current strategic environment and what methods they employ to achieve their national 
interests. Today, it appears nations are relying less on the use of conventional warfare to 
resolve state-to-state conflict, mobilizing instead, an array of state power to achieve 
political and strategic goals without engaging an adversary in direct battle.8 As General 
Valery Gerasimov, the Russian chief of the General Staff, acknowledged in a speech about 
the future of Russian military strategy in 2019, “countries bring a blend of political, 
economic and military power to bear against adversaries.”9 To identify, prevent, deter, or 
counter the Russian hybrid threat, an actor must first understand the nature of Russian 
Hybrid Warfare from their perspective. 
The Russians acknowledge two distinct concepts that the West would categorize as 
Hybrid Warfare: Gibridnaya Voyna and New Generation Warfare. Gibridnaya Voyna 
implies a mix of political, diplomatic, economic, information and other non-military means 
intended to subvert and undermine an adversary, whereas New Generation Warfare 
describes a full-scale military operation, preceded and accompanied by different non-
military actions intended to weaken the adversary’s military power and political 
resilience.10 To help conceptualize the distinction, an example of Gibridnaya Voyna would 
be Russian political, information, and economic actions towards the Baltics and NATO. 
Here, the Russian civilian leadership is employing a range of subversive, non-military 
instruments to further Russian interests, ensure compliance on policy questions, divide, 
and weaken NATO, and subvert pro-western governments in a manner which seeks to 
                                                 
8 Frank G. Hoffman, “Hybrid Warfare and Challenges,” Joint Force Quarterly, no. 52 (2009): 36. 
9 Andrew E. Kramer, “Russian General Pitches ‘Information’ Operations as a Form of War,” The New 
York Times, March 4, 2019, sec. World, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/03/02/world/europe/russia-hybrid-
war-gerasimov.html. 
10 Ofer Fridman, Russian “Hybrid Warfare”: Resurgence and Politicization (New York, NY: Oxford 
University Press, 2018), 163. 
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avoid open confrontation.11 Conversely, an example of New Generation Warfare is 
Russian action in Ukraine. Here, Russia first employed sophisticated information and 
psychological warfare to achieve superiority in the ability to command and control forces 
and suppress the morale of the targeted population. This, then, set the conditions for the 
employment and success of irregular and regular military forces.12 The main objective in 
New Generation Warfare is to reduce the need for deploying hard military power to the 
minimum degree possible by degrading the opponent’s military and civil will to resist.13  
Using these concepts of Hybrid Warfare, Russia developed new guidelines for 
developing military capabilities by 2020, in accordance with the Russian concept of New 
Generation Warfare. The guidelines state that 
the Russian military will move from direct destruction to direct influence; 
from direct annihilation of the opponent to its inner decay; from a war with 
weapons and technology to a culture war; from a war with conventional 
forces to specially prepared forces and commercial irregular groupings; 
from the traditional (3D) battleground to information/psychological warfare 
and war of perceptions; from direct clash to contactless war; from a 
superficial and compartmented war to a total war; from war in the physical 
environment to a war in the human consciousness and in cyberspace; from 
symmetric to asymmetric warfare by a combination of political, economic, 
information, technological, and ecological campaigns.14  
This is essentially what Russian General Gerasimov presented in his article “New 
Generation Warfare.” Commonly referred to as the Gerasimov Doctrine, it does not 
represent a new and dangerous shift in Russian military thinking, it is simply the 
acknowledgment of the usage of long-standing Russian military concepts.15 
                                                 
11 Christopher Chivvis, Understanding Russian “Hybrid Warfare” And What Can Be Done about It 
(RAND Corporation, 2017), 1, https://doi.org/10.7249/CT468. 
12 Fridman, Russian “Hybrid Warfare,” 131. 
13 Janis Berzins, “Russian New Generation Warfare Is Not Hybrid Warfare,” in The War in Ukraine: 
Lessons for Europe, ed. Artis Pabriks and Andis Kudors (Rīga: The Centre for East European Policy 
Studies, 2015), 43. 
14 Berzins, 42. 
15 Doowan Lee and Glenn Johnson, “Revisiting the Social Movement Approach to Unconventional 
Warfare,” Small Wars Journal, (2014): 8. 
7 
A. THE RUSSIAN CHALLENGE AGAINST NATO 
Many scholars argue that Russia is actively seeking to undermine the defense of 
Europe by executing a whole of government strategy that combines direct and indirect 
measures aimed at gaining political leverage over NATO member states.16 This strategy 
mixes a unique blend of traditional elements of statecraft - diplomatic, informational, 
military, and economic - designed to undermine NATO in retaliation for what it views as 
western democracies challenging Russia’s sphere of influence in Eastern Europe.17 
Following the Cold War, Russia perceived the expansion of NATO and the EU into former 
Soviet Bloc nations as a direct threat to Russia’s national interest.18 Throughout its history, 
Russia relied on strategic geographic depth as its greatest security advantage.19 The 
expansion of NATO into Eastern Europe nullified this advantage, threatened Russia’s 
national security, and spurred Russia to respond with asymmetric measures against 
NATO.20  
Russia employs a complex system of tools to execute their Hybrid Warfare strategy 
to undermine the EU and NATO through strategic application of its state power (Figure 1). 
Diplomatically, Russia uses its seat on the United Nations Security Council to veto pro-
Western institutional actions and reforms21 and manipulates the Collective Security Treaty 
                                                 
16 Eric Edelman et al., Providing for the Common Defense: The Assessment and Recommendations of 
the National Defense Strategy Commission (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2018), 
https://www.usip.org/publications/2018/11/providing-common-defense. 
17 Bettina Renz and Hanna Smith, “Russia and Hybrid Warfare-Going beyond the Label,” 2016; John 
J Mearsheimer, “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault: The Liberal Delusions That Provoked Putin,” 
Foreign Affairs, August 18, 2014, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russia-fsu/2014-08-18/why-
ukraine-crisis-west-s-fault. 
18 See pages 5–8 for specific claims against the United States and other western nations, Stephen J 
Blank, “Towards a New Russia Policy” (Carlisle, PA: Army War College Strategic Studies Institute, 2008), 
https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a477748.pdf. 
19 Frederick W. Kagan and Robin Higham, The Military History of Tsarist Russia (New York: 
Palgrave, 2002). 
20 Mearsheimer, “Why the Ukraine Crisis Is the West’s Fault: The Liberal Delusions That Provoked 
Putin.” 
21 Dan Coats, Global Trends, 19. 
8 
Organization (CSTO) as a tool to advance Russian policy.22 Informationally, Russia uses 
a mix of traditional media, cyberspace, and social media to influence the opinions, beliefs, 
and actions of foreign nations’ citizens and decision makers to weaken their resolve.23 
Militarily, Russia annexed Ukrainian sovereign territory in direct violation of international 
law,24 projects its military power across the world to support authoritarian allies,25 and 
maintains a robust nuclear arsenal.26 Economically, Russia coerce nations dependent on 
its natural resources27 by manipulating energy prices and supply and seeks to increase 
European dependence on Russian-supplied energy to undermine NATO.28 Russia’s 
masterful use of its diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of 
statecraft allow it to asymmetrically challenge NATO while avoiding direct military 
confrontation with the West.29  
                                                 
22 Richard Weitz, Assessing the Collective Security Treaty Organization: Capabilities and 
Vulnerabilities, Strategic Studies Institute (Carlisle, PA: Army War College, 2018), 
http://ssi.armywarcollege.edu/pubs/download.cfm?q=1391. 
23 Gjorgji Veljovski, Nenad Taneski, and Metodija Dojchinovski, “The Danger of ‘Hybrid Warfare’ 
from a Sophisticated Adversary: The Russian ‘Hybridity’ in the Ukrainian Conflict,” Defense & Security 
Analysis 33, no. 4 (October 2, 2017): 292–307, https://doi.org/10.1080/14751798.2017.1377883. 




25 Charles K. Bartles, “Getting Gerasimov Right,” Military Review (February 2016): 30–38. 
26 Franklin Miller and Keith B. Payne, “Trump’s Nuclear Deterrence Challenge,” Wall Street Journal, 
November 20, 2016, https://www.wsj.com/articles/trumps-nuclear-deterrence-challenge-1479680000. 
27 Gabriel Collins, Russia’s Use of the “Energy Weapon” in Europe (Houston: Baker Institute for 
Public Policy, 2017), https://www.bakerinstitute.org/media/files/files/ac785a2b/BI-Brief-071817-
CES_Russia1.pdf. 
28 Rem Korteweg, Energy as a Tool of Foreign Policy of Authoritarian States, in Particular Russia 
(Brussels: European Union, 2018), https://publications.europa.eu/en/publication-detail/-
/publication/1c80b8c6-58b6-11e8-ab41-01aa75ed71a1/language-en/format-PDF. 





Figure 1. Systemic Nature of the Problem Diagram. 
B. HISTORY OF RUSSIAN ENERGY COERCION IN EUROPE  
The Soviet Union first capitalized on its vast natural gas resources in the 1950s 
when it began to export gas to fellow Soviet Bloc and Warsaw Pact countries.30 The Soviet 
Union used energy exports, including natural gas, to maintain influence within the Warsaw 
Pact countries by subsidizing cheap energy exports to incentivize politically alignment.31 
However, as early as the 1970s, despite protests from the United States, the Soviet Union 
began to construct pipelines and export natural gas to Western Europe in response to the 
higher demand for natural gas.32 Many of the arguments used today to protest the 
construction of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline are reminiscent of those protestations against 
Soviet natural gas pipelines and exports during the Cold War. For the most part, western 
European nations dismissed opposition to the construction of pipelines by either supporting 
                                                 
30 Bengt Söderbergh, Kristofer Jakobsson, and Kjell Aleklett, “European Energy Security: An 
Analysis of Future Russian Natural Gas Production and Exports,” Energy Policy 38, no. 12 (December 
2010): 7827–43, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2010.08.042. 
31 Randall Newnham, “Oil, Carrots, and Sticks: Russia’s Energy Resources as a Foreign Policy Tool,” 
Journal of Eurasian Studies 2, no. 2 (July 2011): 135, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euras.2011.03.004. 
32 Söderbergh, Jakobsson, and Aleklett, “European Energy Security.” 
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the creation of pipelines outright or by continuing to sell pipeline materials to the Soviet 
Union.33 The initial work done by the Soviet Union during the Cold War laid the 
foundation for the natural gas infrastructure and economic ties in Europe that continue to 
exist today.  
Although most European nations dismissed Cold War opposition to building 
natural gas pipelines, Russian natural gas relations with European countries have not 
always been cordial. In 2017, Gabriel Collins, from the Center for Energy Studies at Rice 
University’s Baker Institute for Public Policy, published a report on Russia’ coercive 
energy policies using natural gas.34 The report detailed over fifteen incidents involving 
former Soviet countries of known or probable politically driven energy or supply 
manipulations of natural gas by Russia 1990 to 2015 (Figure 2).35  
 
Known or probable politically driven energy or supply manipulations by Russia (1990-
2015). 
Figure 2. Russian Energy Manipulations.36 
                                                 
33 Newnham, “Oil, Carrots, and Sticks,” 136. 
34 Collins, Russia’s Use of the “Energy Weapon” in Europe, 8. 
35 Collins, 3. 
36 Collins, 3. 
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At first glance, the report serves as evidence of Russia’s willingness to engage in 
coercive energy actions and supports critics’ arguments against the Nord Stream 2 pipeline 
and increasing European imports of Russian natural gas. However, a more in-depth 
analysis found that most former Soviet Bloc states diversified their natural gas and energy 
supplies away from Russia in response to its initial coercive actions (Figure 3).37 To 
mitigate future coercion, some states invested in LNG terminals or shifted their supply 
chains to receive Russian natural gas through the indirect means of reverse flow supply, 
which reduced vulnerabilities to price manipulations by purchasing Russian gas through a 
third party.38 Interestingly, the report concluded that Russia’s use of coercive actions was 
a strategic miscalculation and resulted in a reduction of natural gas market share in most 
former Soviet Bloc states.39  
 
Assessment of Russia success from known or probable politically driven energy or supply 
manipulations by Russia. 
Figure 3. Strategic Assessment of Russian Energy Manipulations.40 
                                                 
37 Collins, 4. 
38 Stanley Reed, “Burned by Russia, Poland Turns to U.S. for Natural Gas and Energy Security,” The 
New York Times, February 26, 2019, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/02/26/business/poland-gas-lng-russia-
usa.html. 
39 Collins, Russia’s Use of the “Energy Weapon” in Europe, 7. 
40 Source: Collins, 4. 
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C. RUSSIAN DEPENDENCE ON OIL AND NATURAL GAS 
According to BP’s 2019 Statistical Review of World Energy, in 2018 Russia 
possessed 19.8% of the world’s total proven reserves of natural gas, which ranked it first 
just ahead of Iran (16.2%), Qatar (12.5%), and Turkmenistan (9.9%).41 Additionally, 
Russia (17.3%) ranked second, behind the United States (21.5%), in the world’s share of 
natural gas produced, despite the fact that the United States only holds 6.0% of the world’s 
total proven reserves.42 However, because the majority of the United States’ natural gas is 
consumed domestically, Russia is the largest exporter of natural gas. In 2018, Russia 
exported 247.9 billion cubic meters (bcm) of natural gas (21.1% of natural gas exports). 
Of that amount, 212.8 bcm were delivered via natural gas pipelines to Europe.43 The next 
largest exporters of natural gas in 2018 were Qatar (10.1%), Norway (9.8%), and the 
United States (7.8%). According to BP, Russia’s exports in 2018 were over 100 bcm more 
than Norway, the second largest natural gas exporter in 2018.44 
According to the Ministry of Finance for the Russian Federation, in 2018, oil and 
gas exports accounted for 46% of all fiscal state revenue.45 Figure 4 depicts the percentage 
of Russian state revenue derived oil and gas from 2008 to 2018, according to the Russian 
Federation Ministry of Finance. Russia’s heavy reliance on oil and natural gas leaves it 
vulnerable to changes in global supply and demand.  
                                                 
41 BP, BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2019, 68th ed. (London: BP, 2019), 30. 
42 BP, 30–32. 
43 BP, 38–41. 
44 BP, 40–41. 
45 “Federal Budget of the Russian Federation," Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation, 
February 9, 2019, https://www.minfin.ru/en/statistics/fedbud/. 
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Figure 4. Russian State Revenue Derived from Oil and Natural Gas.46  
Figure 5 and Figure 6 further highlight the heavy reliance of Russia’s economy on 
oil and natural gas. As depicted in both figures, Russia’s historic gross domestic product 
fluctuated greatly based on the price of both oil and natural gas.  
 
Changes in Russian GDP compared changes in the average world oil price and Russian 
GDP from 2000 to 2018. 
Figure 5. Russian GDP and World Oil Prices.47  
                                                 
46 Adapted from Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation. “Federal Budget of the Russian 
Federation.” 
47 Adapted from “ Military Expenditure Database,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 
Accessed September 17, 2019), https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex; BP, BP Statistical Review of World 
Energy 2019, 2019. Oil price calculated using average of all price indexes (Dubai, Brent, Nigerian 
Foracados, and West Texas Intermediate) found in BP’s 2019 Statistical Review. 
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Changes in Russian GDP compared to changes in the average European natural gas price 
from 2000 to 2018. 
Figure 6. Russian GDP and European Natural Gas Price.48 
D. RUSSIA’S NATURAL GAS RELATIONSHIP WITH EUROPE 
Historically, Russia relies heavily on the export and sale of crude oil and other 
refined petroleum products to generate state revenue. More recently, Russia is taking 
greater advantage of the vast natural gas resources in the country, and the world’s largest 
proven reserves of natural gas, to provide Europe with approximately one-third of its total 
natural gas imports.49 Today, the combined worth of Russia’s oil and gas amounts to 60% 
of Russia’s Gross Domestic Product (GDP).50 Figure 7 shows data from 2017 depicting 
the percentage of Russian Natural Gas imported by European countries. 
                                                 
48 Adapted from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. “ Military Expenditure Database”; 
BP, BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2019, 2019. Natural Gas price calculated using average of all 
price indexes found in BP’s 2019 Statistical Review 
49 Varsha Koduvayur and Greg Everett, “Russia’s Gas Web Ensnares Europe,” Foreign Policy, April 
17, 2019, https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/04/17/russias-gas-web-ensnares-europe/. 




Data from 2017 depicting the percentage of Russian natural gas imported by European 
countries. 
Figure 7. European Reliance on Russian Natural Gas.51 
Europe imported 38.7% of the natural gas it consumed from Russia in 2018; 
however, that percentage is likely even higher because of Ukraine’s indirect reverse flow 
of Russian natural gas.52 Ukraine and other states use reverse flows as a means of limiting 
direct imports from Russia, while the actual imported natural gas still originates there. 
Based on BP’s 2019 Statistical Review of World Energy, Russian natural gas imports 
provided approximately 9.1% of all energy consumed in Europe in 2018.53  
                                                 
51 Source: Mathew Carr, Vanessa Dezem, and Anna Shiryaevskaya, “Europe’s Gas Buyers Told to 
Prepare for Nord Stream 2 Delay,” Bloomberg, May 15, 2019, 
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-05-15/europe-s-gas-buyers-told-to-prepare-for-nord-
stream-2-delay. 
52 BP, BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2019, 2019, 34–40. 
53 BP, 9–41. 
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In 2018, several countries, Poland (58.1%), Greece (56.2%), Germany (53.7%), 
Turkey (53.3%), Italy (30.9%), and France (25.7%), relied on Russia for large percentages 
of natural gas imports while Slovakia, Hungary, Finland, Austria, and Belarus relied on 
Russia for 100% of their natural gas imports.54 Additionally, Europe imported 35.7% of 
its oil from Russia in 2018. Together, Russian oil and gas exports provided Europe with 
approximately 22% of its total energy.55 These figures paint an interesting and starkly 
contrasting picture between Europe’s security concerns of Russia’s revanchist and 
aggressive actions over the last several years and its reliance—or apparent dependence—
on Russia to meet its energy needs. 
While critics point to Europe’s deep dependence on Russian natural gas, Russia is 
also heavily reliant on export revenues from Europe. In May 2018, Russian President 
Vladimir Putin announced ambitious plans to reform the Russian economy. The plan, 
widely referred to as the “May Decree,” established the goals of halving Russia’s poverty 
rate and achieving 4% yearly GDP growth by the year 2024.56 However, achieving these 
aggressive goals may be difficult due to Russia’s reliance on exporting oil and gas to a 
European market that is seeking to diversify its energy imports and reduce carbon 
emissions. In 2018, 91.4% of Russia’s natural gas exports and 59.1% of its oil exports went 
to Europe.57 Russia’s lack of economic diversification creates vulnerabilities for the 
Russian economy and leaves it susceptible to fluctuations in oil and gas prices and energy 
demand in Europe. In response, Russia is looking to follow Europe’s lead and diversify its 
export markets by increasing its Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) capabilities and building 
pipelines, as depicted in Figure 8, to Southeast Asia—where future energy demand expects 
to outpace other regions in the world.58  
                                                 
54 BP, BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2018, 67th ed. (London: BP, 2018), 34. 
55 BP, 8–41. 
56 World Bank Group, “Preserving Stability; Doubling Growth; Halving Poverty - How?” 
(Washington, DC: World Bank, November 2018), 24, 
http://pubdocs.worldbank.org/en/673631543924406524/RER-40-English.pdf. 
57 BP, BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2018, 24–34. 
58 BP, BP Energy Outlook: 2019 Edition (London: BP, 2019), 95. 
17 
 
Figure 8. Russian Gas Transmission Systems in Eastern Russia.59 
E. FUTURE NATURAL GAS PROJECTIONS AND RUSSIA 
According to BP’s 2019 Energy Outlook, by 2040, natural gas demand and 
consumption will grow at a faster rate than both oil and coal.60 Additionally, the outlook 
forecasts natural gas will surpass coal as the second largest source of energy, behind only 
oil.61 BP also projects LNG exports will surpass inter-regional pipeline exports by late 
2020 based on their assessment that LNG terminals are a more convenient and reasonable 
option for countries in Southeast Asia. In 2017, global pipeline exports were 740.7 bcm, 
and global LNG exports were 393.4 bcm.62 Exxon Mobil’s energy projections also show 
natural gas use is likely to increase more than any other energy source.63 According to 
Exxon Mobil, significant factors in projecting future increases in natural gas demand are 
due to its abundance and its versatility in helping the world shift toward energy that 
                                                 
59 Source: Gazprom, “Pipeline Projects: Power of Siberia,” accessed May 30, 2019, 
http://www.gazprom.com/projects/power-of-siberia/. 
60 BP, BP Energy Outlook: 2019 Edition, 79. 
61 BP, 79. 
62 BP, 34. 




produces less carbon emissions.64 McKinsey and Company’s Energy Insights projects 
approximately 50% of future natural gas demand is expected to come from Asia, with 
China representing about one-third of worldwide demand by 2035. McKinsey and 
Company’s Energy Insights also projects natural gas output in Europe will decline by the 
year 2035.65  
Although most worldwide projections for future natural gas demand include Russia 
and its vast natural gas reserves, the country’s lack of development in future extraction and 
production technologies could limit its potential. The United States Energy Information 
Agency (EIA) is more cautious in its long-term projections of natural gas and questions 
conventional assumptions about future extraction capability keeping pace with forecasts of 
natural gas demand.66 If Gazprom and other Russian companies are going to attract 
investment and develop the technologies needed to continue to produce natural gas at a rate 
required to meet future demand, Russia will likely need to reform its laws regarding foreign 
direct investment and overcome its image as a corrupt economy. Furthermore, the threat of 
future sanctions emanating from the United States and the EU may turn away potential 
investors because they fear the risk of losing returns on their investments. Based on recent 
its current behavior and lack of reforms, Russia can expect little investment or support from 
the United States or the EU.  
F. IMPACTS OF THE NORD STREAM 2 PIPELINE 
Critics of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline believe increasing Russian natural gas exports 
to Europe will increase Russia’s leverage and influence within the EU and NATO. 
Conversely, supporters of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline believe it provides assurances for 
Europe’s future energy security, allows Europe to more rapidly reduce carbon emissions, 
                                                 
64 Exxon Mobil. “2018 Outlook for Energy: A View to 2040.” 
65 “Global Gas and Energy Outlook to 2035” McKinsey Energy Insights, September 2018, 
https://www.mckinsey.com/solutions/energy-insights/global-gas-lng-outlook-to-
2035/~/media/3C7FB7DF5E4A47E393AF0CDB080FAD08.ashx. 
66 Office of Energy Analysis, Annual Energy Outlook 2019 with Projections to 2050. Report No. 
AEO2019. Washington, DC: U.S. Energy Information Administration, January 2019, 74. 
19 
and decreases the chance of future conflict by increasing economic interdependence 
between European nations and Russia.  
1. Perceptions of the Nord Stream 2 Pipeline 
The existing Nord Stream pipeline, sometimes referred to as Nord Stream 1, began 
operations in 2011 (Figure 9).67 Initially scheduled for completion in December 2019, the 
Nord Stream 2 is experiencing delays due to concerns from Denmark about the route of 
Nord Stream 2 through its territorial waters.68 Both pipelines have the capacity to carry 55 
bcm of natural gas per year, which is approximately one-fourth of the gas exported to 
Europe in 2017.69 One significant difference between the two pipelines is the ownership 
stake of Russia’s state-owned natural gas company, Gazprom. Whereas Gazprom owns 
51% of the original Nord Stream pipeline, it owns 100% of the Nord Steam 2 pipeline.70 
Additionally, plans for another pipeline through Turkey, called the TurkStream, reveal that 
Russia intends on increasing its share of the European natural gas market.71  
                                                 
67 Paul Belkin et al., Nord Stream 2: A Fait Accompli?, CRS Report IF11138 (Washington, DC: 
Congressional Research Service, 2019), 2, https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/IF/IF11138. 
68 Mathew Carr, Vanessa Dezem, and Anna Shiryaevskaya, “Europe’s Gas Buyers Told to Prepare for 
Nord Stream 2 Delay.” 
69 BP, BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2018, 34. 
70 Belkin et al., Nord Stream 2: A Fait Accompli?, 1. 
71 Mathew Carr, Vanessa Dezem, and Anna Shiryaevskaya, “Europe’s Gas Buyers Told to Prepare for 
Nord Stream 2 Delay.” 
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Figure 9. Overview of Nord Stream 1 and Nord Stream 2.72 
2. Critics of Nord Stream 2 
Critics of the Nord Stream 2 view the pipeline as another example of Russia’s 
attempt to gain influence and to increase Europe’s energy dependence on Russia’s mineral 
resources. Detractors believe the increased exports of Russian natural gas will increase 
Russia’s economic leverage across the continent. Critics of the pipeline point to the Soviet 
Union’s historical use of natural gas as a foreign policy tool to keep Soviet Bloc countries 
politically compliant and to increase Soviet influence in Western Europe.73 Many leaders 
and policy-makers in the United States, NATO, and the EU fear that Nord Stream 2 is just 
the latest attempt by Russia to seek a measure of control over its former Soviet allies and 
as a tool to divide and sow distrust within Western alliances and organizations.74 
Furthermore, critics believe the pipeline will allow Russia to bypass Ukrainian pipelines, 
                                                 
72 Source: Bojan Pancevski, “How a Russian Gas Pipeline Is Driving a Wedge Between the U.S. and 
Its Allies,” Wall Street Journal, March 10, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-a-russian-gas-pipeline-
is-driving-a-wedge-between-the-u-s-and-its-allies-11552254955. 
73 Michael Charokopos and Athanasios Dagoumas, “State Capitalism in Time: Russian Natural Gas at 
the Service of Foreign Policy,” Europe-Asia Studies 70, no. 3 (March 16, 2018): 450, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/09668136.2018.1448367. 
74 Bojan Pancevski, “How a Russian Gas Pipeline Is Driving a Wedge between the U.S. and Its 
Allies.” 
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which would deprive that country of revenue in the form of transit fees.75 Currently, around 
40–50% of Russian natural gas exports transit through pipelines in Ukraine.76 Bypassing 
Ukraine may provide Russia with the insurance policy it needs to take actions to reassert 
its influence in Ukraine without risking disruptions to its natural gas exports. Russia took 
similar steps to bypass Chechnya between the first and second Chechen Wars. Poland’s 
foreign minister, Jacek Czaputowicz, summed up many Europeans’ fears of the Nord 
Stream 2 when he stated, “Poland views the Nord Stream 2 as a significant threat to the 
peace and security on the European continent from the point of view of deepening 
European countries’ dependence on Russian energy and the prospects for an escalation of 
Russian aggression against Ukraine.”77 In response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea, the 
EU pushed for greater diversification of its energy resources, however, the Nord Stream 2 
pipeline undermines these EU efforts and raises issues of mistrust amongst EU countries.78 
Figure 10 shows an overview of supportive and unsupportive EU countries of the Nord 
Stream 2 pipeline.  
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Figure 10. Gas Import Routes in Eastern Europe.79 
The United States government is also interested in the Nord Stream 2 pipeline. In 
2017, Congress passed The Countering Russian Influence in Europe and Eurasia Act 
(CRIEEA), which included language opposing the Nord Stream 2 pipeline because of its 
potential impact on security, the negative impacts to the EU’s new energy diversification 
strategy, and the effect on Ukraine.80 Additionally, in February 2019, a bi-partisan group 
of Senators introduced the Defending American Security from Kremlin Aggression Act 
(DASKA) of 2019. Although the bill does not mention the Nord Stream 2 pipeline by name, 
several provisions in the bill seek to impose penalties on activities directly related to 
                                                 
79 Source: Marco Giuli, Nord Stream 2: Rule No More, but Still Divide (Brussels: European Policy 
Centre, 2018), 5. 
80 Belkin et al., Nord Stream 2: A Fait Accompli?, 2. 
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building the pipeline and the Russian natural gas sector.81 Even more recently, Congress 
introduced a bill directly targeting the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, which, according to then-
U.S. Secretary of Energy Rick Perry, is expected to pass Congress and be signed into law 
by the president.82 Germany will do little to quell diplomatic, and potentially economic, 
backlash it receives from the United States if it presses forward with construction on Nord 
Stream 2. Moving forward with construction will likely result in a deeper diplomatic divide 
between the two allied countries and decrease the level of trust between Germany, its EU 
partners, and the United States. 
3. Supporters of Nord Stream 2 
Supporters of the Nord Stream 2 pipeline offer critics several counter arguments. 
First, the Soviet Union was never able to use energy to significantly influence European 
and NATO member states during the Cold War despite increased imports of Russian 
natural gas. More importantly, as illustrated by Gabriel Collins’ study, Russia’s past 
attempts to employ coercive economic policies were strategic failures and resulted in 
adverse long-term effects for Russia. Similarly, supporters of Nord Stream 2 assess 
Russia’s actions in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine as strategic failures. Since 2014, NATO, 
EU members, Ukraine, and the United States refocused security priorities to combat what 
they perceive as Russian attempts to undermine their security and now stand more prepared 
to meet future challenges from Russia. Supporters argue that although the Nord Stream 2 
would increase Europe’s reliance on Russian natural gas, it is highly unlikely Russia will 
apply previous tactics of supply and price manipulation, or attempt to bypass Ukrainian 
gas pipelines, because similar tactics resulted in strategic failures for Russia. 
Second, supporters argue that greater economic interdependence between Russia 
and Europe will reduce the chances of conflict in the future. Russia relies heavily on natural 
gas and oil to provide state revenue. This reliance leaves Russia vulnerable to changes in 
                                                 
81 Richard Nephew, “Understanding and Assessing the New U.S. Sanctions Legislation Against 
Russia” (New York: Columbia University: Center on Global Energy Policy, February 15, 2019), 2. 
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market prices and susceptible to diminishing future demand as Europe increases renewable 
energy consumption under the Paris Climate Accords. If technological innovations in 
renewable energy reduce demand for natural gas and oil, then it will profoundly impact 
Russia’s relative advantage in proven oil and gas reserves. Supporters of the Nord Stream 
2 believe Russia must continue to work amicably with European countries in the future 
because it cannot afford the potential loss of revenue that could result from deliberate 
supply flow interruption or price manipulation.  
Lastly, supporters of the Nord Stream 2 point out that European countries will need 
additional natural gas imports from Russia due to the Netherlands’ decision to drastically 
reduce natural gas production.83 In 2018, the Netherlands exported 32.5bcm of natural gas 
across Europe. However, the reduction of natural gas production in the Netherlands will 
require European nations to look elsewhere to offset their import requirements, and the 
Nord Stream 2 offers a cheap alternative to the Netherlands for many Western European 
countries. 
G. SUMMARY OF THE LITERATURE 
In an era of Great Power Competition, the nature of state-to-state relationships and 
power positioning appears more reliant on, and more open to diplomatic, economic, and 
influence strategies, than on the use of military power. For instance, Russia’s current hybrid 
warfare strategy employs a mix of political, diplomatic, economic, and information means 
designed to achieve state goals. In this manner, Russia hopes to simultaneously undermine 
the collective prosperity and security efforts of the EU and NATO while maintaining 
Russian influence using information campaigns and the export of fossil fuels throughout 
EU and NATO nations.  
In the realm of economics, Russia’s power and influence is dependent on the 
production, export, and sale of oil and natural gas. As a primary tool, Russia’s significant 
oil and gas reserves serve to finance its domestic requirements, military modernization, 
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and to improve its status as a regional power. Current assessments correlate the amount of 
Russian oil and gas imported by European countries with Russia’s economic influence 
within these countries. Therefore, it stands to reason that the more European countries rely 
on Russian fuels, the more influence Russia gains within those countries thereby enhancing 
its ability to disrupt and degrade unity and collective security across Europe. Thus, Russia’s 
hybrid warfare strategy would seem to make sense.  
However, as changes in energy perceptions throughout Europe shift towards 
renewables and away from fossil fuels, Russia’s reliance on fossil fuel exports creates an 
economic vulnerability. Additionally, Russia’s recent aggressive actions in Crimea and the 
Ukraine resulted in a shift away from a reliance on Russian energy resources. The potential 
loss in revenue and influence from these shifts would have a significant negative impact 
on the Russian GDP. The shift to renewables, however, will take decades to phase in, and 
in the meantime, Russia is using its natural resources, primarily natural gas, to fill Europe’s 
energy requirements. Russia is taking steps, such as the construction of the Nord Stream 2 
pipeline, to secure their status as the primary exporter of fossil fuel energy throughout 
Europe, thereby maintaining influence and sustaining their economy.  
Currently, energy interdependence between Russia and Europe mutually benefits 
both sides. Europe gains the energy they require, while Russia continues to maintain and 
improve its economy through energy export. From a U.S. perspective, it may appear that 
Russia utilizes oil and gas to dominate the market and to sow dissension among EU and 
NATO partner states. However, from a Russian perspective, this is a matter of national 
survival. Overwhelmingly, the literature supports that Russia is conducting hybrid warfare 
to erode the collective functions of the EU, NATO, and transatlantic partnerships with the 
U.S. However, the energy interdependence between Russia and Europe may result in a 
balancing effect, which could potentially sustain stability within the region.  
The remainder of this study will use system dynamics modeling to examine the 
effects, and determine the veracity of, Russia’s use of its energy resources in Europe as 
part of its hybrid warfare strategy. This study will use Estonia and Germany to highlight 
the risks to the U.S., EU, NATO, and Russia regarding their developing energy 
relationships. To model these two case studies, this thesis utilizes historical data to show 
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the effects of Russian fuels on domestic policies within the two countries and to better 
inform future policy decisions within the U.S., EU, and NATO. 
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III. RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
This thesis uses an exploratory research methodology that compliments current 
analysis of Russia’s threat to the security of the EU and NATO by leveraging qualitative 
and quantitative data for systems analysis and system dynamics modeling of Russian 
energy relations with Europe. This thesis has two purposes: (1) to model the structure of a 
bounded endogenous system intended to investigate Russia’s use of energy resources to 
influence NATO members, Germany and Estonia; and, (2) to model policy scenarios to 
assess their impact on Russia, Europe, and trans-Atlantic relationships. The exploratory 
research in this thesis will aid national security decision-makers within the U.S. by 
analyzing potential behavioral outcomes resulting from non-linear feedback mechanisms 
within the model.  
A. RESEARCH APPROACH—SYSTEM DYNAMICS 
System dynamics utilizes quantitative analysis informed by qualitative insights to 
model an endogenous system that is creating problematic behavioral outcomes. In the case 
of Russia using non-military actions to achieve political goals and to influence NATO, the 
system dynamics research approach uses a time-based model that analyzes a decade’s 
worth of data to enhance an understanding of non-linear feedback mechanisms that result 
in the problematic behavior. The modeling also offers a user Interface that provides a 
decision support tool for assessing the potential impact of various policy alternative on 
future system behavior.  
Many analysts view Russia and European energy relations through a geopolitical 
lens that simplifies the relationship between entities and assigns motives and causal 
relations based on broad geopolitical perspectives and paradigms. Such reductionist 
analysis of Russia’s energy relations with Europe discounts the complex dynamics that 
exist between Russia and Europe and takes an exceedingly simplistic approach to 
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analysis.84 Conversely, system dynamics thinking and modeling provides a methodology 
to quantify the analysis of complex relationships, feedback, and system structures that 
reductionist analysis discards. While not a replacement for all current tools, system 
dynamics thinking and modeling may provide a more holistic viewpoint.85 A system 
dynamics modeling approach to the complex study of Russian strategic economic coercion 
can provide greater understanding and analysis of all the factors that contribute to Russia’s 
overall influence on the EU and NATO. 
B. DESCRIPTION OF SYSTEM DYNAMICS 
System dynamics thinking and modeling offers a viable methodology to provide 
greater understanding and insight into the systemic relationship between Russian energy 
and European nations. Donella Meadows, former Massachusetts Institute of Technology 
(MIT) Research Fellow and Dartmouth Professor, and Diana Wright describe a system as 
“a set of things—people, cells, molecules, or whatever—interconnected in such a way that 
they produce their own pattern of behavior over time.”86 Whereas reductionist analysis 
breaks down complex systems into simple and easily distinguishable parts to explain the 
function of the system, system dynamics analyzes the entire system to understand its 
structure, feedback, and behaviors. This system view allows analysts to model an 
endogenous system to discern structural relationships that are resulting in problematic 
behavior. According to Dr. Wayne Porter, system dynamics modeling is a useful policy 
tool to assist “policy and planning analysts in order to better inform decision-makers and, 
ultimately, to overcome the pitfalls of policy resistance, cognitive biases, and dissonance 
                                                 
84 Andrew Judge, Tomas Maltby, and Jack D. Sharples, “Challenging Reductionism in Analyses of 
EU-Russia Energy Relations,” Geopolitics 21, no. 4 (October 2016): 751–62, 
https://doi.org/10.1080/14650045.2016.1222520. 
85 Donella H. Meadows, Thinking in Systems: A Primer, ed. Diana Wright (White River Junction, VT: 
Chelsea Green Pub, 2008). 
86 Meadows, 1. 
29 
among communities of interest seeking to find common analytic ground.”87 To analyze 
Russia’s energy relations with Europe and the potential long term impact of proposed 
policy recommendations, this thesis will utilize causal loop diagrams (CLD) and system 
dynamics modeling. 
C. CAUSAL LOOP DIAGRAMS 
A CLD is a tool used in system dynamics to represent feedback structures in a 
system (see Figure 11 for a CLD example).88 A significant difference between reductionist 
thinking and systems thinking involves capturing and accounting for feedback. Feedback 
represents the dynamic relationship between variables in a system and CLDs are a 
graphical representation of those causal relationships. CLDs depict the cause and effect 
between variables in a system and not simply correlation.89 CLDs classify variables linked 
through a causal relationship as either positive or negative. According to John Sterman, 
MIT Doctoral Professor and Director of MIT’s System Dynamics Group, “A positive link 
(+) means that if the cause increases, the effect increases above what it would otherwise 
have been, and if the cause decreases, the effect decreases below what it would otherwise 
have been.”90 Sterman continues his explanation of polarity by stating, “A negative link (-
) means that if the cause increase, the effect decreases below what it would otherwise have 
been, and if the cause decreases, the effect increase above what it would otherwise have 
been.”91 In addition to link polarity, CLD feedback loops are classified as either 
“balancing” or “reinforcing.” A balancing feedback loop (B) opposes the direction of 
change enforced by the system, and a reinforcing feedback loop (R) strengthens the 
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direction of change.92 Additionally, modelers refer to balancing feedback and reinforcing 
feedback loops as positive and negative, respectively. In subsequent chapters, this thesis 
will develop multiple CLDs to reflect the causal relationships between variables related to 
Russia and Europe’s energy relations to illustrate the system’s feedback structures. CLDs 
provide insight and understanding of a system’s feedback structure and the 
interdependencies of its variables; however, they are a qualitative description of the system 
and have limitations in producing quantitative understanding.93 Conversely, stocks and 
flows are system dynamics modeling tools for quantitative analysis and understanding, 
which often develop after a modeler gains a qualitative understanding of a system.  
 
Shows the relational effects of multiple variables on a population and provides an 
illustrative summary for the definitions of link polarity and feedback loop identification. 
Figure 11. Example CLD.94  
D. STOCK AND FLOW MODELS 
Stocks and flows, along with feedback, are the most essential concepts of systems 
theory.95 Stocks depict measurable accumulations of variables and generate information 
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about the system used by decision-makers.96 Flows represent the rate of change to the 
accumulation or value of a stock.97 A flow is either an inflow and increases the 
accumulation in a stock, or an outflow, which decreases the accumulation in a stock.98 
Stocks are not only physical objects but can measure intangible quantities such as goodwill 
or hope.99 To better understand how a system behaves over time, stock and flow models 
use a calculous-centered methodology to analyze a system’s structure and its resulting 
feedback. Figure 12 shows an example stock and flow diagram.  
 
Figure 12. Example Stock and Flow Diagram.100 
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IV. ESTONIA MODEL 
Focusing on how Russia employs hybrid warfare in the Baltics, specifically in 
Estonia, may help the EU, NATO, and the U.S. better understand the destabilizing effects 
Russia may have in the region. Russia has used cyber-enhanced influence operations in 
Estonia and the Baltics in conjunction with economic hard power. Currently, the EU and 
NATO are experiencing the effects of this new Russian ideology and the employment of 
Hybrid Warfare in the form of economic coercion in the Baltics.  
The weaponization of an energy resource, in this case natural gas, falls in line with 
current Russian strategic thinking and their shift to hybrid warfare, which includes the use 
of political, economic, informational, humanitarian, and other nonmilitary measures.101 
Therefore, by controlling the flow of energy resources combined with an accompanying 
information campaign backed by potential militarily aggressive or de-escalatory actions, 
Russia strives to influence policy decisions in the region. For example, as Jim Collins 
noted, “Increased Western European dependence on Russian gas would raise questions 
about the willingness of some of those countries to aid smaller Central and Eastern 
European nations, such as Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia, in the face of Russian aggression 
or subversion.”102 Conversely, dependence on Russian gas may affect the willingness of 
those smaller states to support aggressive actions towards Russia in fear of corresponding 
aggressive action or a negative manipulation of the gas streams. Collins further emphasized 
this point in stating, “Policymakers’ aversion to the potential short-term losses caused by 
a gas supply cutoff or a politically-driven price increase could expose them to 
manipulation, undermine their resolve to stand up to Russian revanchist actions in and near 
Europe, and divide and weaken the EU and NATO.”103  
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Using the Baltic State of Estonia as an initial case study, this research employed 
system dynamics to model the influence of Russian gas and energy fuel imports on 
Estonia’s elections and role in NATO. The model incorporated historical data over a ten-
year period, from 2007 – 2016, to provide policy and decision makers a better 
understanding of the non-linear dynamics in the Russia-Estonia system of energy, trade, 
and security relationships, and projections of potential future system behavior.  
A. ESTONIA CLD 
Figure 13 shows a CLD that illustrates how Russia’s influence on Estonian politics 
and defense spending affect Estonia’s imports and reliance on Russian Energy. The 
feedback on the left depicts Russian influence on Estonian politics and the feedback on the 
right represents Russian influence on Estonian defense spending. The CLD indicates a 
reinforcing feedback system of influence in Estonia’s politics and a balancing feedback 
system of Estonian defense spending. The feedback structures of the system benefit Russia 
and increase demand for its most abundant energy export resources: oil, and gas. The 
current structure of the system allows Russia to export its energy resources to Estonia 
regardless of its security situation with Estonia. Until Estonia discontinues importing 
Russian energy, Russia’s economy will continue to benefit from the feedback structure of 
the current system.  
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Figure 13. Estonia CLD. 
Russia’s goal in the current system is to maintain its political influence on Estonian 
politics. The most significant factor influencing Russia’s ability to maintain its political 
influence is its aggression in the region. This thesis defines Russian aggression as an action 
- diplomatic, informational, military, or economic - that directly or indirectly threatens the 
sovereignty of Estonia or its citizens. Based on Russia’s political influence, if Russia 
decreases its aggression in the region, it will increase Estonia’s reliance on Russian energy. 
Increased reliance on Russian energy increases Russia’s domestic net exports and results 
in a higher Russian GDP.104 However, because the political influence system feedback 
structure is reinforcing, when Russian aggression in the region increases, it decreases its 
political influence and Estonia’s reliance on Russian energy. Russia is unlikely to increase 
its aggression in the region because it will negatively affect its GDP. Yet, in circumstances 
that drive Russia to increase its aggression in the region, Estonia will still increase its 
                                                 
104 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) calculated using expenditure approach.  
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demand for Russian energy because of the existing balancing feedback system structure 
concerning Estonia’s defense spending.  
Russia may increase its aggression in the region when it considers such actions in 
support of its national interest. Increased Russian aggression decreases its political 
influence in Estonia; however, the balancing feedback of Russia’s influence on Estonia’s 
defense spending offsets the negative effects of Russia’s decreased political influence. The 
balancing feedback system of Russia’s influence on Estonia’s defense spending provides 
Russia with a continuous demand for Russian energy. The increased demand for Russian 
energy exports eventually leads to a decrease in Russian aggression and a reinforcing 
feedback loop of Russia’s renewed influence over Estonia’s politics. This, in turn, increases 
Estonia’s demand for Russian energy and benefits the Russian economy.  
Russia has positioned itself to continue to benefit economically from Estonia, even 
if its perceived actions in the region directly, or indirectly, threaten the sovereignty of 
Estonia or its citizens. As the feedback structure of the system suggests, Russia can take 
aggressive actions in the region to defend its natural interests without increasing the risks 
of negatively impacting its economy. The CLD suggests that Russia will continue to benefit 
from the established system and remain economically undeterred in the region unless 
Estonia finds other import sources for its fuel and gas energy requirements or increases its 
use of alternative energy. 
B. ESTONIAN STOCK AND FLOW DIAGRAM 
The Estonia stock and flow diagram (Figure 14) is a time-based model utilizing 
data from 2007 to 2016 to formulate patterns and extrapolate correlating data between 
specific components that result in Estonian national behavioral outcomes. Specifically, the 
model analyzes the effects of Russian fuel imports on Estonia’s trade balance and GDP, 
and whether Russia can manipulate the Estonian government and civil population through 
energy warfare based on the influence of consumer-ready fuels. Additionally, the model 
uses financial and elections data from the World Bank, the Organization for Economic 
Development (OECD), the Estonian national electoral committee (Valimised), and NATO 
to ensure accuracy and converted monetary values to U.S. dollars for standardization.  
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Figure 14. The Estonia System Dynamics Model. 
The green portion of the model analyzes the Estonian gross domestic product 
(GDP). The primary stock is the annual GDP for the small Baltic state. The model’s focus 
is on imports and exports. The imports and exports divide into four separate categories: 
capital goods, consumer goods, intermediate goods, and raw materials. Each one of these 
four categories contribute to an inflow and outflow (Exports in-flow, Imports out-flow) 
that affect the GDP stock. The model used an additional converter that connects the inflow 
and outflow valves to provide a percentage-based Trade Balance converter.  
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Figure 15. Estonian GDP and Total Trade Balance from 2007 to 2016.105 
Other components of the Estonian economy - (private) consumption, fixed 
investment, change in inventories, government purchases (i.e., government consumption), 
and net exports - flow into the GDP via the Add GDP Factors converter. This converter 
connects to a separate inflow, which adds these additional dollars to the GDP stock. An 
“equilibrium” outflow was added to ensure the modeling functionality of the annual data; 
otherwise, the stock would continue to accumulate value in addition to the previous year’s 
GDP.  
                                                 




Figure 16. GDP Portion of the German Model. 
The most important aspect of this portion of the model is the Russian Fuels 
converter. This converter allows for the discrimination of imported fuels as a subset of 
overall consumer goods imported. Russian fuels are defined here as consumer-ready 
energy, such as natural gas or refined gas. The importance of this converter is that it can 
highlight spikes or drops in fuel imports that may affect system behavior such as Russian 
aggression and changes in polling data because of system feedback.  
The next portion of the model focuses on the Estonian population (Figure 17). 
Utilizing the population data over the last ten years, the model uses the average growth rate 
and death rate over that period to produce population numbers for future analysis in other 
sections of the model. The model’s numbers show that the population growth of Estonia is 
steadily declining. This, in turn, negatively affects the GDP due to the lack of growth in 
consumer products and spending. 
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Figure 17. NET Population Portion of German Model. 
In addition to the net population data, a connector from the Net Population stock 
links to a GDP per capita converter that computes this based on an input from the GDP 
stock.  
 
Figure 18. Estonia’s NET Population from 2007 to 2016.106 
The final section of the Model (Figure 19) is the most complex and important for 
this thesis. The purpose of this portion of the model is to use Estonian political polling data 
to compute Estonian pro-nationalist or pro-Russian political sentiment. While conducting 
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41 
the research to populate the model, data included election polling from more than six 
official Estonian political parties, depending on the specified year’s research.107  
 
Figure 19. Estonian Support for NATO Portion of the Estonian Model. 
The Unsatisfied population (pro-Russian) out-flow is derived from the Estonian 
Center Party converter. This party gains strong influence from the greater than 20% ethnic 
Russian population (although not all are pro-Russian), the majority of whom reside in the 
rural areas of Estonia.108 The location of the Russian diaspora is significant because the 
hardship of the winters may create stronger support for the use of Russian fuels to heat 
Estonian homes and to fuel vehicles.109 It is also likely that the Russian information 
campaign is stronger in specific areas of Estonia, particularly those with higher ethnic 
Russian populations. 
The Estonian nationalist and/or globalist political parties affect the rate of change 
in the Satisfied Population. Although these two groups are very different in their respective 
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belief systems, data shows that from a political perspective, Estonian parties adapt to form 
coalitions to protect their parliamentary power. In Estonia, Parliamentary power is based 
on the formation of a coalition that holds a majority in the 101-seat parliament. Winning 
most seats is important, but establishing a coalition of political parties to build a voting 
base is just as critical. Currently, the difference between a pro-Russian and a pro-Estonian 
nationalist/globalist coalition government is the result of approximately ten thousand votes 
in the national elections. Of note, the model did not include dual Estonian-Russian citizens 
who comprise approximately 7% of the Estonian population (total population is 1.3 
million) not allowed to vote in the Estonian elections.  
The Estonian Support stock connects to the Impact on NATO Spending converter. 
This converter connects to the Estonia $$ to NATO, which also receives data input from 
the GDP stock to compute a percentage of GDP as Estonia’s contribution. Currently, 
Estonia meets the annual NATO defense spending requirements of greater than 2% GDP.  
The NATO defense budget increases as a response to input from the Aggressive 
Russian Military Actions converter which, in turn, receives an input from the Russian Fuels 
converter. Because Russia is heavily dependent on Russian fuel exports, decreases in 
Estonian imports creates a perceived threat to stability due to the negative economic 
impacts of lost export revenue. In response to the perceived threat, Russia increases its 
aggressive behavior to influence regional leaders with the aim of increasing market share 
or export capacity. Based on past behavior, the model assumes Russia does not possess the 
diplomatic capability to influence other countries without resorting to some form of hybrid 
coercive actions. Consequently, NATO countries increase defense spending. Figure 20 




Figure 20. Changes to NATO’s Budget and Russian Aggression.110 
C. FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE MODELING 
The most import finding of this model is the impact of Russian fuels on the 
population (both directly through messaging and through its impact on the per capita GDP). 
In this manner, Russia is taking advantage of reinforcing feedback to ensure the viability 
of its export model while maintaining significant influence in EU and NATO countries. 
The model suggests that as the Estonian government enhances its defense spending, their 
need for additional fuel increases. With Russia maintaining control as the primary supplier, 
Estonian imports of Russian fuel create feedback that ultimately benefits the Russian state-
run fuel and gas companies. Furthermore, this simultaneously provides Russia leverage 
when sanctions or Estonian import policy reduce the importation of Russian fuels.  
As Russian aggressive actions increase, NATO increases defense spending, thereby 
driving an increase in Estonia’s expected contribution. Russia’s actions may then 
eventually force Estonia, the EU, and NATO members to reduce sanctions to meet the fuel 
and gas demands of an increasing and mobilizing defense force. Potentially, increasing the 
import of natural gas and oil may benefit all parties. Revenue for Russia helps stabilize 
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their economy while reducing their need to be aggressive in the region, which ultimately 
also favors Estonia.  
The current model shows how Russian energy contributes to the Estonian GDP, 
which then influences the Estonian population and their support for NATO. Additionally, 
it highlights how an increase in Estonian NATO defense spending also increases their 
dependency on Russian fuels. This essentially creates a no-lose situation for Russia.  
Further expansion of the model could address three courses of action intended to 
counter Russian economic influence in the region. This would involve increasing the 
economic prosperity of other countries in the region while also influencing the pro-Russian 
population within Estonia.  
The first course of action would be to model an information campaign focused on 
countering Russia’s use of hybrid warfare and propaganda. This would focus on increasing 
Estonian nationalist coalition support, particularly among the citizens who reside in the 
border cities, as well as among the 7% of the Estonian population registered as dual citizens 
with Russia. In the most recent 2019 elections, the nationalist EKRE party, or Conservative 
People’s Party of Estonia gained enough parliamentary seats to leverage a position in the 
governing coalition with the Centre Party. The EKRE is a potential point of leverage for 
Russia to target in an information campaign due to their anti-Russian and anti-EU political 
platforms.111 Russian leverage of Estonian’s ability to fuel their homes is an avenue to 
exploit.  
The second course of action to incorporate into the model would be the substitution 
of Russian fuels imported into Estonia with Norwegian fuels. Norway is one of the largest 
natural gas producing countries in the world, and its proximity to the Baltics makes it a 
viable substitute for Russian fuels. This would require a costly new pipeline, but the 
motivation for this would not only be to eliminate Estonian dependency on Russian fuels 
but would also increase Norwegian economic prosperity in the region. With other 
EU/NATO nations in the region also standing to benefit, the cost of a new pipeline would 
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require sharing among EU/NATO partner nations. Finding innovative ways for wind, solar, 
or hydroelectric power to offset fossil fuels may also reduce dependency on Russian fuel 
imports while increasing economic opportunities in Estonia.  
The third course of action is to refine the impact of political parties on Estonian 
legislation and support for NATO. The intent would be to model factors that could 
positively impact Estonia’s economy and population through legislative policy changes. 
Finally, future work could expand this model to include all the Baltic states, 
focusing on Russian economic and information influence within NATO. 
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V. GERMAN MODEL 
Without its energy export revenue, Russia cannot modernize its defense forces, 
carry out President Putin’s reforms, or fund its Middle East aspirations for greater 
influence. While the U.S. military trains and modernizes for great power competition with 
Russia, the lack of a coherent and long-term economic strategy to compliment the 
military’s efforts to address the national security challenge posed by Russia is the 
inspiration for this thesis.  
Russia’s primary economic concern is the export and sale of its energy resources; 
a critical vulnerability that a U.S. strategy could potentially exploit. Therefore, strategies 
to deter, counter, compete, and, if necessary, defeat Russia must include measures to 
disrupt or deny Russian energy exports, which will decrease Russia’s revenue. The 
National Security Strategy describes how the United States will seek to sustain prosperity 
and security in the face of great power competition. This currently apparently includes a 
mix of military deployments to Eastern Europe, increased defense spending, and sanctions 
against Russia. However, due to an increase in its 2018 energy exports, Russia set new 
records for energy and overall revenue.112 For the first time since 2011, Russia achieved a 
budget surplus and grossed over $300 billion in 2018 state revenue. Many analysts believe 
Russia’s long-term outlook appears bleak due to an overreliance on energy exports and a 
pending demographic crisis.113 Yet, these recent economic gains provide little proof that 
current U.S. actions are deterring or limiting Russia’s ambitions.  
A. PURPOSE OF THE GERMAN MODEL 
There are three primary purposes for modeling Germany’s renewable energy 
transition and its impact on Russia’s energy revenue. First, the modeling will provide a 
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deeper understanding of Germany and Russia’s energy relations by identifying critical 
variables within the dynamic system of energy and trade between the two countries that 
are most impactful to reducing Russia’s ability to generate future revenue through the 
export of its energy resources. Second, the German model will provide quantitative metrics 
to support the analysis of potential policy measures designed to reduce Russia’s revenue 
earned from the export of resources to Germany. Third, the model will facilitate qualitative 
analysis of the strategic European-Russian energy relationship based on the system 
dynamics modeling.  
This thesis selected Germany as the second case study based on its progressive 
energy transition plan, Energiewende, its status as the largest European economy in both 
NATO and the EU by gross domestic product, its prominent role in the on-going debate 
about the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, and its role as the largest European importer of Russian 
oil and gas by volume.114 Germany’s Energiewende provides the framework for the 
German model and its analysis of what the future may hold for Russia and its economic 
and security dependence on fossil fuel energy exports. Energiewende aims to make 
significant reductions in fossil fuel usage through increased usage of renewable energy. 
Figure 21 depicts the status of Germany’s energy transition in 2016/2017 and targeted 
projections for future years.115 Germany provides a case study for Western European 
countries that are apparently more concerned with perceived threats from climate change 
than perceived threats from Russia 
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Progress report from June 2019 on the status of the Germany Energiewende. 
Figure 21. Energiewende Report Card.116 
This thesis uses several future hypothetical scenarios to better understand and 
analyze potential impacts on Russia’s energy revenue. Utilizing the German system 
dynamics model, this thesis will compare the future values of Russian state revenue, 
Russian energy revenue, and Russian defense spending between the scenarios.  
B. INTRODUCTION AND CLD 
Figure 22, the German CLD, depicts the causal relationships between multiple 
independent and dependent variables related to Germany’s energy transition and their 
impact on the Russia economy. The CLD identifies four primary interrelated loops: an 
outer security loop, a natural gas bridging loop, coal and oil transition loop, and a German 
energy transition loop.  
                                                 




Figure 22. German CLD. 
1. Outer Russian Threat Loop 
The Outer Russian Threat Loop identifies interrelated variables and the system 
feedback structure between German imports of Russian fossil fuels and Russia’s economic 
well-being. The system structure identifies a balancing feedback loop between Russia’s 
economy and their energy exports to Germany. As depicted in the CLD, the 
interdependence and balancing effect can potentially create stability and serve as a 
deterrent against coercive Russian energy policies towards Germany. The potential for 
stability results from the leverage both Russia and Germany hold over each other because 
of each country’s dependence on the energy revenue and resources of the other, 
respectively. The potential loss of revenue received by Russia from its energy exports to 
Germany offsets Russia’s threat to Germany, and Russia’s role as Germany’s largest 
energy supplier provides it with leverage over the energy requirements of the country. 
Importantly, the outer security loop is less dominant than the Climate Change Threat Loop, 
because Germany places a higher priority on combatting the effects of climate change than 
on Russian aggression. The Outer Russian Threat Loop will become the dominant loop 
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when Germany meets its renewable energy transition goals. Additionally, the Outer 
Russian Threat Loop becomes the dominant loop when renewable energy proves 60% of 
Germany’s total energy consumption, which aligns with their 2050 Energiewende goals as 
depicted in Figure 21. 
2. Natural Gas Bridging Loop 
Because natural gas creates less pollution then other fossil fuel sources, specifically 
oil and coal, many countries view it as an energy bridging solution for the transition to 
more renewable and cleaner energy consumption.117 Currently, the renewable energy 
capacity in Germany cannot provide enough energy to meet Germany’s energy 
requirements. Battery storage technology, renewable energy infrastructure, and initial 
overhead costs limit the ability of Germany to immediately transition away from fossil 
fuels. However, many believe climate science suggests an urgent need to transition away 
from fossil fuels. Because natural gas is relatively cheaper and cleaner than coal and oil 
alternatives, it is the most likely solution to fill the short-term gaps in energy requirements 
during the transition away from fossil fuels. During the transition from coal and oil to 
renewable energy sources, the feedback structure of the Natural Gas Bridging Loop 
increases natural gas consumption to meet Germany’s future energy requirements. 
Eventually, renewable energy will replace natural gas, but only after natural gas imports 
increase over the short to near term to meet overall energy demand.  
3. Coal and Oil Transition Loop 
The Coal and Oil Transition Loop reinforces the reinforcing increase in natural gas 
consumption. The loop’s reinforcing system feedback structure results in the exponential 
growth of natural gas because Germany’s energy requirement increases too fast for 
renewable and hydroelectric energy sources to satisfy the demand. Therefore, decreases in 
oil and coal cause natural gas use to increase. The system feedback structure continues to 
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increase natural gas until there is no longer a need for a bridging solution. At this point, 
renewable energy will begin to replace natural gas requirements to meet Germany’s energy 
demand. At this point, the reinforcing system feedback structure of the Natural Gas 
Transition Loop (discussed below) results in the decrease of natural gas consumption. 
4. Climate Change Threat Loop 
The Climate Change Threat Loop depicts the causal relationships between the 
consumption of different energy resources and the fossil fuel pollution that increases the 
perceived threat of climate change. Because of fossil fuel pollution, the perceived threat of 
climate change increases. This increase results in greater support for Germany’s 
Energiewende energy transition, which increases the consumption of renewable energy 
sources and replaces natural gas. The priority to replace coal and oil results in an initial 
delay in renewable consumption replacing natural gas. However, once renewable 
consumption replaces oil and coal consumption, natural gas decreases because of 
reinforcing behavior, causing fossil fuel pollution to decrease, as does the perceived threat 
of climate change. Eventually, the transition from fossil fuels to renewable energy would 
ideally meet the climate security needs of German citizens and the perceived threat from 
the Outer Russian Security Loop would begin to dominate the entire feedback system 
structure, which decreases German imports of Russian energy over the long term.  
Based on this system structure, Russia could increase its energy revenue in the 
short-term. However, once the perceived threat of climate change subsides because of the 
transition to renewable energy, Germany’s imports from Russia will decrease as the threat 
of Russia becomes a priority for Germany.  
5. Nord Stream 2  
Supporters of Nord Stream 2 believe it provides Germany with a safety net should 
it fail to achieve its Energiewende goals. Energiewende is Germany’s plan to switch to 
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100% renewable energy by the year 2050.118 To reach its goal, Germany plans to slowly 
phase-out fossil fuels and nuclear energy while simultaneously increasing its investments 
in renewable energies.119 In its most recently announced transition timeline, Germany 
plans to completely reduce its nuclear power reliance by 2022, which it intends to offset 
with renewable energy resources.120 Should Germany fail to offset its reduction in coal 
and nuclear with renewable energy sources, the Nord Stream 2 provides the country with 
a cheap alternative to fill any potential energy deficit with natural gas until it can develop 
its renewable energy capacity. However, Germany believes it is more than capable of 
achieving its renewable energy goals and sees no cause for concern by increasing its 
capacity to import Russian natural gas.  
Despite Germany’s plan to transition to renewable energies, the United States 
remains concerned that plans to reduce carbon-heavy energy resources, such as coal, will 
increase the demand for Russian natural gas because it is less environmentally harmful than 
coal. Additionally, the number of NATO partners failing to meet their NATO funding 
commitments has exacerbated political tensions related to natural gas. Since 2016, the 
Trump Administration became increasingly frustrated with Germany for failing to reach 
its NATO defense spending requirement of 2% of GDP. From the administration’s 
perspective, Germany’s failure to meet the alliance’s defense spending mandate 
undermines the trust and cohesion of the NATO Alliance. Although defense spending as a 
percentage of GDP may not be a good measure of Germany’s vast contribution to NATO 
and Europe’s defense, Germany’s unwillingness to increase defense spending while at the 
same time supporting additional Russian natural gas infrastructure is a substantial point of 
contention between the United States and Germany. 
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The German model includes the Nord Stream 2 by assuming that after its 
completion, Germany will import approximately 80.6% of its natural gas from Russia. 
Currently, Germany imports just above 61.5% of its natural gas from Russia. The increase 
in Russian natural gas simulates the impact of both increased capacities to import Russian 
fuel and the future decrease of Netherlands natural gas imports.  
6. Russian Revenue and Defense Spending 
The German model includes several variables to measure energy export revenue 
from Germany, Russian revenue from energy resources, Russian state revenue, and 
Russian defense spending. Based on historical data and percentages, the German model 
calculates the impact of German imports of Russian energy resources on Russia’s state 
revenue and defense spending. The Russian revenue and defense spending are the most 
important variables in the model because they provide the quantitative data results 
necessary to assess how the different scenarios and policy measures included in this thesis 
affect Russia. The findings and recommendations in this section depend significantly on 
how policy measures affect the Russian revenue and defense spending variables. 
Additionally, the model assumes that any increase in Russian defense spending will result 
in an increase in Russian military, intelligence, and national security capabilities and 
capacity.  
The model includes German imports of Russian coal, oil, and natural gas to assess 
the impact of an energy transition across the spectrum of Russian energy exports. Although 
Germany’s plan to use natural gas as a bridging fuel will likely increase Russian revenue 
from the sale of exports to Germany, it may offset Germany’s reduction in coal and oil 
imports from Russia. The systemic modeling of Russian energy exports provides the means 
to better analyze the impact of a European energy transition on the Russia economy and 
security.  
7. Significant Variables for Future Revenue and Policy Measures 
The German model analyzes several scenarios, including several potential U.S. 
policy measures for confronting Russia. Importantly, the model focuses on the impact of 
three factors that have an outsized effect on Russian revenue. First, the German model 
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assesses the impact of the Nord Stream 2 on Russian revenue and defense spending based 
on different German import percentages of natural gas. Second, the model assesses the 
impacts of reduced or increased energy prices. Russian fossil fuel revenue accounted for 
46% of its GDP in 2018 and any reduction or increase in price will affect Russia’s ability 
to generate state revenue.121 Third, the German model assesses the impact of an increase 
in Germany’s renewable energy production capability. Over the last five years, Germany 
increased its renewable energy production and consumption by 6.8% annually; however, 
over the previous ten years it increased by 11.3%. The baseline growth rate for renewable 
energy production and consumption uses the five-year average; however, an increase in the 
rate will increase the rate at which renewable energy sources replace fossil fuels. An 
increased replacement rate will result in less Russian energy imports over time and 
accelerate the rate at which Germany meets its 2050 goal of 60% renewable energy 
consumption. If Germany meets its 60% Energiewende goal it will cause a decrease in the 
perceived threat of climate change and an increase in the perceived threat from Russia, 
which will further reduce Russian energy imports as well as Russian revenue and defense 
spending.  
C. PRIMARY DATA SOURCES  
British Petroleum’s 2015–19 Statistical Reviews of World Energy are primary data 
sources for energy consumption, growth rate, and other energy related information. The 
model predominantly uses the measurement, Million Tons of Oil Equivalent (MTOE), to 
standardize the energy consumption between different energy sources and to initialize 
stock values. It also uses BP’s trade data to calculate the percentage of natural gas imports 
in Germany and BP’s historical coal, oil, and natural gas pricing to calculate average prices. 
Additionally, the model uses conversion factors to convert MTOE to price related 
measurement units for coal, oil, and natural gas and to initialize the revenue values for each 
respective Russian energy export resource. Finally, the German model uses historical 
                                                 
121 Ministry of Finance of the Russian Federation. “Federal Budget of the Russian Federation." 
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consumption data to generate consumption growth rates for Germany’s total future energy 
requirement, renewables and hydroelectric energy. 
The Federal Budget of the Russian Federation, provided by the Russian Ministry 
of Finance, is the primary source for information related to Russian revenue and defense 
spending. The model uses the Russian Federal Budget to measure the impact of Germany’s 
energy transition on Russian revenue and defense spending by calculating the annual and 
accumulated revenue and defense spending values over the duration of the model’s run 
time.  
Lastly, the model uses information from The Clean Energy Wire (CLEW), an 
independent non-profit, non-partisan journalists’ service focused on covering Germany’s 
energy transition, to determine the percentage of coal and oil Germany imports from 
Russia.122 Accordingly, in 2017 Germany imported 38.5% of the coal it consumed and 
37% of the oil it consumed from Russia.123 The German model projects future Russian 
revenue by assuming the percentages of German imports stay the same until after Germany 
reaches 60% of renewable energy consumption, which then elevates Russia as the top 
German national security threat and assumes a 25% decrease in Russian imports. 
D. GERMAN STOCK AND FLOW DIAGRAM 
Three interrelated sectors comprise the German model (Figure 23). Feedback from 
two variables, “Threat from Climate Change” and the “Russian Threat,” connect the sectors 
together the dynamic system structure. The first sector models the impact of Germany’s 
theoretical energy transition and the second sector models the impact on Russia’s energy 
revenue and defense spending. Additionally, the model uses a user Interface to evaluate 
changes oil and coal price values, the percentage of revenue spent on Russian national 
defense, the increased import percentage from the Nord Stream 2, and an increase in growth 
rate for renewable energy production and consumption.
                                                 
122 Julian Wettengel, “Germany’s Dependence on Imported Fossil Fuels,” Clean Energy Wire, April 
29, 2019, https://www.cleanenergywire.org/factsheets/germanys-dependence-imported-fossil-fuels. 
123 Julian Wettengel. 
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Figure 23. Overview of the German System Dynamics Model. 
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1. Energy Transition Sector 
The energy transition sector of the model (Figure 24) uses a future energy 
consumption growth rate to calculate Germany’s future energy requirements. The growth 
rate is based on data from BP’s statistical review. The energy requirement acts as the 
model’s pacing item and ceiling to prevent an unnecessary and unrealistic over production 
and consumption of energy. Additionally, this sector uses a renewable energy consumption 
growth rate, based on the last five years of BP data, to increase Germany’s renewable 
consumption. The growth in renewables replaces other energy sources in a sequential order 
starting with nuclear energy. Next, renewable energy consumption sequentially, replaces 
coal, oils, and natural gas. This assumed order is based on previous announcements from 
the German government about shutting down nuclear (2022) and coal (2038) consumption 
in the future and assumes oil will transition next due the potential for electric cars to replace 
vehicles with combustible engines in the future.124 Natural gas is last to transition last due 
to its low carbon emissions compared to coal and oil.  
                                                 
124 Erik Kirschbaum, “Germany to Close All 84 of Its Coal-Fired Power Plants, Will Rely Primarily 
on Renewable Energy.” 
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Figure 24. Energy Transition Sector of the German Model. 
Natural Gas is the only stock that increases before renewable energy consumption 
replaces the fuel. The first sector aggregates the MTOE from each energy source consumed 
per year to calculate the model’s annual energy consumption. Natural gas growth is 
determined by comparing the difference between the calculated annual energy 
consumption and the future energy consumption requirements. Natural gas fills any 
difference between the two variables.  
The “Renewable Energy Accelerant,” is the only converter in the first sector 
included in the model’s user Interface. The purpose of the variable is to assess the impact 
on Russia’s revenue and defense spending if Germany increased its renewable energy 
consumption growth rate from its five-year average 6.8% to its 10-year 11.3% average 
growth rate. The increased growth rate reduces the transition time from other energy 
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sources to renewables and in doing so, likely decreases Russian revenue and defense 
spending (or forces Russia to increase the percentage of revenue it spends on defense).  
 The Threat from Climate Change” variable is a critical part of the first sector and 
in feedback structure of the overall model. The variable reduces the renewable growth rate 
by 25% once renewable energy sources reach 60% of German energy consumption. 
Additionally, after renewables reach 60% of German energy consumption, impact of 
Threat from Climate Change is reduced, which results in an increase in the Russian Threat 
in the second sector of the model that is focused on measuring the energy export impact on 
Russia’s revenue and defense spending.  
2. Russian Energy Export Revenue from Germany 
The second sector of the model (Figure 25) uses data from BP’s Statistical Reviews 
of World Energy to initialize the coal, oil, and natural gas values. Then, using historical 5-
year oil, natural gas, and coal prices, the model calculates annual revenue from each energy 
resource. The model includes converters for each resource to convert MTOE values to the 
standard unit of measurement for each resource’s market price. Then, the revenue value 
flows into the “Energy Export Revenue from Germany” stock, which accumulates the 
entire amount of revenue Russia receives from its energy exports to German.  
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Figure 25. Second (top) and Third (bottom) Sectors of the German Model. 
The second sector includes three different variables that are adjustable in the 
model’s Interface (Figure 25). First, the Nord Stream 2 toggle increases the percentage of 
Russian natural gas imports from ~61% to ~80% to account for the increased pipeline 
capacity and the Netherlands’ future natural gas export reduction. Second, the interface 
facilitates the adjustment of the price of oil and natural gas. The adjustment facilitates 
simulating and analyzing the impact on Russia from decreases or increases in oil and gas 
prices around the world. For example, the recent increase in natural gas production in the 
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U.S. significantly reduced the price of natural gas, and the more recent Iranian attack on a 
Saudi Arabian oil refinery increased in oil prices.125  
The “Russian Threat” variable plays a critical role in the feedback between the first 
and second sectors of the model. As noted earlier, once renewables reach 60% of German 
energy consumption, Germany’s perception of climate change as a threat is reduced, and 
subsequently, Germany’s perception of Russia as a primary threat is increased. As a result, 
Russian exports of natural gas and oil decrease exponentially over a 10-year period because 
of the graphical inputs from the “Shift Away from Russian Energy” converter, which is 
only activated after Russia replaces climate change as Germany’s primary threat. 
Figure 26. German Model Interface. 
3. Russian Revenue and Defense Spending
Using information from the Russian Ministry of Finance, the third sector of the 
model extrapolates the revenue Russia receives from Germany to calculate Russia’s total 
State Revenue from exports. The calculation of Russia’s energy revenue is based on 
historical data of the percentage of Russian revenue that originates from Germany. Then, 
the model calculates Russian State Revenue based on the 5-year average percentage of total 
Russian revenue contributed by energy exports. Importantly, the model assumes non-
125 Paula Stern, The LNG Moment: How U.S. Production Could Change More than Just Markets 
(Washington, DC: Atlantic Council, 2019), https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/commentary/article/the-lng-
moment-how-us-production-could-change-more-than-just-markets/; Clifford Krauss and Stanley Reed, “Oil 
Prices Spike After Attack on Saudi Facilities but Lasting Disruption Seen Unlikely,” The New York Times, 
September 15, 2019, sec. Business, https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/15/business/saudi-arabia-oil-energy-
prices.html. 
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energy related revenue remains a percentage of total revenue and does not move 
independently or provide additional revenue from a historical growth rate. Next, the model 
uses historical percentages from Russian State Revenue to calculate Russian Defense 
Spending. Additionally, Russian Energy Revenue, Russian State Revenue, and Russian 
Defense Spending variables flow into “accumulation” stocks to measure the amount of 
money gained or lost over the course of the entirety of the model’s run-time instead of 
annual amounts provided by variable converters. The third sector includes an adjustable 
scale in the Interface for the percentage of Russian revenue spent on national defense to 
assess the different amounts Russia can, or needs to, invest in its national security based 
on the impacts of Germany’s energy transition.  
E. MODELING RESULTS 
The first iteration of results of the German model comprise the baseline results from 
which to compare all other modeling results. The baseline results use the average 5-year 
price for oil, coal, and natural gas based on BP’s 2018 statistical review. Additionally, the 
baseline model assumes the Nord Stream 2 is not operational and does not include an 
increase in the percentage of German natural gas imported from Russia. Finally, the 
baseline model uses 6.8% as the renewable energy consumption and production growth 
rate based on the calculated 5-year historical growth rate average of BP’s statistics.  
This thesis uses Russian Energy Revenue, Russian State Revenue, and Russian 
Defense Spending variables to compare additional scenarios with the baseline iteration. 
Comparisons are completed using each variable’s accumulated value at the end of the 
modeled time-period. These variables provide the feedback to facilitate further 
understanding and analysis of the European and Russian energy relationship and its 
associated security implications for the United States.  
1. Single Variable Scenarios  
In addition to the baseline, this thesis uses results from six single variable scenarios 
to measure the impact of each variable on Russian Revenue. 
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(1) Nord Stream 2 
This scenario assumes the Nord Stream 2 is operational and increases German 
imports of Russian natural gas from 61.25% to 80.62% to replace the expected decrease of 
German natural gas imports from the Netherlands. 
(2) Renewable Energy Accelerant  
This scenario assumes Germany increases their annual renewable consumption 
growth rate from 6.68% to 11.3%. Germany averaged an 11.3% annual renewable energy 
consumption growth rate between 2009–2018; however, the rate dropped to 6.68% over 
the last five years. This scenario assumes the United States, EU, and NATO countries adopt 
a renewable energy transition policy and invest heavily in renewable energy technology 
and infrastructure to reduce Europe’s dependence on Russian energy and negatively impact 
the Russian economy. The increased investments allied support allows Germany to 
maintain an 11.3% renewable energy consumption growth rate in the future.  
(3) Increase in Oil Price 
This scenario assumes the future price of oil is $97.66 per barrel. This was the 
average annual price in 2014 and the highest annual price average over the last five years 
based on BP’s 2019 Statistical Review of World Energy. In this scenario, Russia increases 
its use of hybrid warfare to disrupt oil markets and oil producing countries in the Middle 
East. These actions drive oil prices higher and Russia continues to take deliberate actions 
targeted at sustaining the price increase.  
(4) Decrease in Oil Price 
This scenario assumes the price of oil is $43.02 per barrel. This was the average 
annual price in 2016 and the lowest average annual price over the last five years based on 
BP’s 2019 Statistical Review of World Energy. In this scenario, the United States continues 
to increase its oil production rates commensurate with the last five years, which drastically 
increases global supply and decreases demand and the price of oil. Using policies that 
support expanding oil drilling and production, the United States deliberately seeks to drive 
down the price of oil to negatively impact the Russian economy.  
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(5) Increase in Natural Gas Price 
This scenario assumes the price of natural gas is $10.09 per million Btu. This was 
the average annual price in 2014 and the highest average annual price over the last five 
years based on BP’s 2019 Statistical Review of World Energy. In this scenario, natural gas 
demand in China, India, and other Asian Pacific countries outpaces production across the 
world, which increases global demand and the price of natural gas. Additionally, Russia 
increases its use of hybrid warfare to disrupt natural gas flows to the Asia Pacific region 
via LNG from the Middle East, Europe, and the United States, which also increases the 
price of natural gas.  
(6) Decrease in Natural Gas Price 
This scenario assumes the price of natural gas is $4.73 per million Btu. This was 
the average annual price in 2016 and the lowest average annual price over the last five 
years based on BP’s 2019 Statistical Review of World Energy. In this scenario, the United 
States and Norway deliberately increase natural gas production to flood the global market 
to drive down the price of natural gas and negatively impact the Russian economy. 
2. Multi-Variable Scenarios 
Next, this thesis uses a combination of the Oil Price, Gas Price, Annual Renewable 
Energy Consumption Growth Rate, and the Nord Stream 2 variables to analyze the 
potential security implications of Russia’s energy trade relationship with Germany and 
assess what measures are most effective at disrupting or denying Russian energy exports 
and revenue. 
1. Increase in Natural Gas Price and Nord Stream 2.  
2. Increase in Oil and Gas Prices. 
3. Decrease in Natural Gas Price and Nord Stream 2. 
4. Renewable Energy Accelerant. 
5. Nord Stream 2 and Renewable Energy Accelerant.  
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6. Decrease in Oil and Gas Prices and Nord Stream2. 
7. Increase in Natural Gas Price, Nord Stream 2, and Renewable Energy 
Accelerant. 
3. Impacts on Russian Revenue and Defense Spending 
Figure 27 shows the modeling results in terms of Russian State Revenue, Russian 
Energy Revenue, and Russian Defense Spending for each scenario. Figure 28 depicts the 
difference between the baseline scenario and all other scenarios in terms of Russian State 
Revenue, Russian Energy Revenue, and Russian Defense Spending.
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Figure 27. Results from German System Dynamics Modeling. 
 
Figure 28. Difference between Each Scenario and the Baseline Values.
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F. FINDINGS 
The results of the German model produced several interesting findings. First, when 
comparing the six single variable scenarios in this thesis to the baseline, the renewable 
energy accelerant scenario resulted in the largest impact to Russian revenue. Increasing the 
renewable consumption growth rate accelerated Germany’s energy transition and resulted 
in Germany achieving 100% renewable, or hydroelectric, energy consumption by the year 
2037, as shown in Figure 29. This is significantly faster than the baseline shown in Figure 
30. Due to Russia’s reliance on energy exports, Russia is likely weary of any country 
seeking to transition its energy consumption to renewables, or other energy that negates 
the need for energy imports from Russia. For Russia, the most dangerous geopolitical 
course of action is a fast transition for Germany and other customers from fossil fuels to 
other sources of energy.  
 
Area graph depicting the change in Germany’s annual energy consumption by resource 
when Germany’s annual renewable growth rate increases. 




Area graph depicting the change in Germany’s annual energy consumption by resource for 
the baseline scenario. 
Figure 30. Energy Consumption during Baseline Scenario.  
The negative effect of a German transition to renewable energy on Russia’s revenue 
has two potential implications for U.S. and European policymakers. First, because it is not 
in Russia’s best interest for countries to transition away from fossil fuels, expect Russia to 
increasingly focus its information operations on undermining domestic support for 
renewable energy transitions and to downplay negative or perceived concern for the effects 
of climate change. Second, based on the modeled scenarios, in the long run, the most 
effective means for the U.S. or Europe to disrupt or deny Russia increases in revenue from 
its sale of energy resources is to invest and support energy transitions away from fossil 
fuels.  
Another important finding based on the modeled scenarios is that price increases of 
oil and natural gas created more revenue for Russia then the Nord Stream 2. However, the 
U.S. and Europe would likely view Russia’s use of hybrid warfare to disrupt energy 
markets and increase the price of oil and natural gas as extremely provocative, which could 
result in severe diplomatic and military consequences for Russia. Therefore, the Nord 
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Stream 2 becomes even more important to Russia’s ability to increase its future energy 
revenue.  
Figure 31 shows a comparison in Russian revenue between when the Nord Stream 
2 is operational and when it is not. Based on the German model, when the Nord Stream 2 
is operational it provides Russia with an additional $140 billion in total accumulated energy 
revenue over the next 10 years. Most arguments against the Nord Stream 2 focus on 
geopolitical implications of the new pipeline. Specifically, detractors argue the Nord 
Stream 2 will increase Europe’s dependence on Russian energy or allow Russia to bypass 
natural gas transit routes through Ukraine to deny the country transit revenue and isolate it 
from the rest of Europe. However, based on the modeling in this thesis, the Nord Stream 2 
clearly provides Russia with a significant increase in revenue in addition to the pipeline’s 
perceived geopolitical advantages.  
 
Difference in Russian revenue from Germany when Nord Stream 2 is operational (left) and 
when it is inoperable (right). 
Figure 31. Impact of Nord Stream 2 on Russian Revenue.  
G. FUTURE MODELING RECOMMENDATIONS  
Although the German system dynamics model provides important insight into 
Russia’s energy vulnerabilities, future modeling may improve the current model by 
including multiple countries or using aggregated organizations, such as the EU. Future 
modeling efforts can combine countries with similar energy policies or make assumptions 
about domestic policy based on the international institution’s or organization’s overall 
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policy. Including more countries, or larger organizations in future models, will provide 









Europe currently relies heavily upon oil and natural gas imports from Russia to 
sustain its significant energy demand, and Russia’s economic outlook and stability are 
dependent upon its exportation of natural resources to Europe. Although many suggest that 
Europe needs to reduce its dependence on Russian resources, the potential monetary losses 
to Russia could destabilize the Russian economy and, thus the entire region. This thesis 
uses system dynamics modeling to analyze the various risk factors in multiple scenarios 
that affect Russian and European energy relations and the associated impacts on collective 
security strategies. The results of the modeling scenarios highlight several important 
factors that affect the risk calculous for future U.S. policies towards Europe and Russia. 
Russia is extremely dependent on fossil fuel revenue and lacks a clear strategy to 
deal with a future in which its trade partners will likely rely more on renewables and less 
on fossil fuels. Over the last several years, Russia’s strategic investments focused on 
increasing its natural gas export capacity, development and production of potential oil and 
gas reserves in the arctic. However, Russia has yet to deal with significant underlying 
issues that threaten the sustainability of the economy, including the loss of skilled workers, 
a diminishing population, rampant corruption, and the lack of foreign investment. Vladimir 
Putin’s government and leadership have inhibited Russia’s ability to make the necessary 
economic, governmental, and societal reforms. The system Putin has established benefited 
the oligarchy, but it will likely produce adverse effects long after he leaves office.  
The U.S. should consider strategies that exploit Russia’s dependence on fossil fuel 
revenue to deter or degrade Russia. However, Russia will likely view strategies that employ 
sanctions to directly target its economy as escalatory. Strategies that employ indirect 
methods to impact Russia’s fossil fuel-dependent economy—such as improving non-fossil 
fuel energy technologies and increasing non-fossil fuel energy consumption—are more 
likely to reduce escalation and still achieve strategic effects. While the U.S. should compete 
with Russia across all instruments of statecraft, it is important for the U.S. to minimize 
escalatory actions that could unnecessarily place alliance partners—particularly in Eastern 
Europe—at higher risk of kinetic response. 
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Figure 32. Nesting Operational Tasks with National Strategy Documents.126 
Europe is arguably the most interdependent and internally aligned region of the 
world, but each country possesses unique domestic political considerations and 
perspectives of national security. Disagreements between the EU and NATO members over 
military spending and Russian fuel imports are complicated by various domestic and 
diplomatic dynamics. Differing opinions on security priorities and threats can create 
tension and disunity among EU and NATO countries that complicate the majority and 
consensus support these international organizations and alliances require. For example, the 
U.S. and Germany both believe Russia is a threat to the safety and security of Europe; 
however, their prioritization of Russia compared to other national security issues differs.  
Currently, the most contentious issue between the United States and its European 
allies is defense spending in NATO. However, a new consensus on what defines defense 
spending within the alliance may help alleviate at least some of the consternation. If 
Europe’s perceived dependence on Russian energy is a security concern—and source of 
tension with NATO allies—for the United States, then redefining what NATO considers 
as defense spending may prove beneficial for all member states. Russia’s hybrid threat—
as this thesis supports—includes exploiting economic and energy vulnerabilities within 
                                                 
126 Adapted from Trump, National Security Strategy of the United States of America; Mattis, 
Summary of the 2018 National Defense Strategy. 
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NATO. Therefore, the United States should support including investments in LNG import 
terminal, that can import natural gas from non-Russian sources, as defense spending. Doing 
so may incentivize countries to diversify away from Russian energy sources and potentially 
increase U.S. energy exports with European partners. At the very least European countries 
could possibly negotiate a lower import price on Russian natural gas if Russia believes they 
have an alternative option to import LNG instead of complete dependence on natural gas 
from Russian pipelines. In any event, redefining NATO defense spending—to include non-
military spending that supports the collective defense and resiliency goals of the alliance—
is appropriate to meet the hybrid economic security challenges posed by Russia.  
Finally, it is noteworthy to acknowledge that economic interdependence between 
Europe and Russia can create stability under the right conditions.127 While many argue 
that the EU is dependent on Russian energy, the EU is Russia’s largest trading partner and 
its largest contributor in foreign direct investment (FDI)—the EU provided 55% of all FDI 
to Russia in 2017.128 Furthermore, as this thesis showed, Russian revenue is still largely 
dependent on oil and natural gas demand from Europe. If U.S. policymakers fear Europe 
is dependent on Russian energy, then they should also feel comforted by Russia’s overall 
economic reliance on Europe’s markets. The asymmetric economic relationship between 
Europe and Russia suggests that Europe holds strategic economic leverage over Russia. In 
the long run, it may be more beneficial for Europe to increase its economic cooperation 
and interdependence with Russia to gain further economic leverage as a potential deterrent 
to a future conflict involving Europe and Russia. 
Diplomatic, military, and economic ties with European countries were instrumental 
in establishing rules-based governance after World War II. The U.S. and its European 
partners will likely need each other once again in the future as rising and revisionist global 
powers seek to challenge and disrupt the peace and stability that U.S. and European 
leadership provided in the past.  
                                                 
127 Dale C. Copeland, “Economic Interdependence and War: A Theory of Trade Expectations,” 
International Security 20, no. 4 (1996): 5–8, https://doi.org/10.2307/2539041. 
128 European Commission, “EU and Russian Trade,” Trade, November 9, 2019, 
https://ec.europa.eu/trade/policy/countries-and-regions/countries/russia/. 
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